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FOREWARD
Dr. Chapman’s FORCES report on the current state of the emerging southeast Pacific alliance
between Australia, the UK, and the US cannot come at a timelier moment. Albeit written in
the middle of a European Security Crisis, the report reminds us of the vital importance of the
US Pacific Strategy. The United States has been for more than half a century by economic
and political connections more of a Pacific than Atlantic power. More important, while trying
to encourage the Europeans to emancipate themselves militarily, the US should renew
its presence and power projection in the Pacific. Many worrisome signs indicate that this
realignment is overdue, from the recent takeover of the fabled battlefields of Guadalcanal
and the Solomons by Chinese interests to the increasingly aggressive stance of the Chinese
Navy and strategic forces in the Western Pacific. The present report provides the necessary
understanding of what is at stake and what an alliance with three major stakeholders can
deliver in the long run.

As other FORCES reports, Professor Chapman’s contribution highlights the work conducted
at Purdue University to provide timely and practical knowledge necessary to navigate the
turbulent waters of the contemporary security crisis.

Sorin Adam Matei
Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Education | College of Liberal Arts
Professor of Communication | Brian Lamb School of Communication
Director | FORCES Initiative
Purdue University
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
▶ The AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Agreement seeks to enhance multinational
deterrence against Chinese geopolitical assertiveness by giving Australia nuclear
powered submarines.
▶ This agreement will pose considerable cost and technical challenges for the
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
▶ Estimates of when Australia will be able to deploy nuclear submarines range from
2030-2040.
▶ The U.S. and its allies will have to make challenging decisions about where to
build AUKUS in Australia.
▶ There is debate as to whether efforts to deter China in the Asia-Pacific should
include non-Anglosphere countries in that region.
▶ Consideration should be given as to how China will respond to AUKUS and
whether this response will include Beijing increasing security cooperation with
North Korea and Russia.
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OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION
Many observers of international security developments may have been surprised
when the Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) announced the
September 16, 2021 signing of an agreement between these three countries which would
facilitate the exchange of nuclear propulsion between the U.S. and UK with Australia. This
high-profile agreement was signed by President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris
Johnson, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. This event was motivated by the
growing power and assertiveness of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the
western Pacific and will result in Australia eventually receiving stealthy long-range nuclear
power submarines better able to confront Beijing’s increasing military assertiveness. It also
reflects increasing maritime military spending in the Asia-Pacific region.1
Preliminary terms of this agreement were that Canberra, London, and Washington would
engage in an 18-month consultation period to seek the best ways to deliver nuclear-powered
submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest possible date, permitting each
country to exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, and provide authorization to
share restricted data. This is also the first time London and Washington have expanded the
scope of this nuclear sharing agreement since these two countries signed an earlier Mutual
Defense Agreement in 1958. 2
Numerous factors motivating this tripartite agreement are derived from China’s increasing
geopolitical assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region with special demonstration of this
provided by PLAN’s increasing military capabilities. These include its continually increasing
surface, submarine, and air power capabilities, its desire to achieve greater control or
dominance of its near-seas region with particular emphasis on the South China Sea; Beijing
stressing that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in a 200 mile maritime
exclusive economic zone; defending commercial sea lines of communication linking China
to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific, and asserting Beijing’s
status as the preeminent regional power and a major global power.
To achieve these goals, many believe China wants its navy to provide anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) force capability to deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in an adjacent region
such as Taiwan or delaying the arrival and effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces in such a
5
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conflict. The U.S. has responded to China’s increasing assertiveness by devoting a greater
percentage of its fleet to the Pacific and assigning its newest ships, aircraft, and mostskilled personnel to this region; increasing its presence and training with allied navies in this
operational theater; developing new maritime warfare concepts and technologies such as
unmanned and precision technologies and seeking to counter Chinese A2/AD efforts.3
Specific examples of China’s increasing naval capability include PLAN surpassing the
U.S. Navy in battle force ship numbers, their increasing technological sophistication which
includes modern multi-role platforms with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine
weapons and sensors. This also includes weapons acquisition programs emphasizing
capabilities targeting U.S. and allied surface ships, submarines, aircraft, unmanned vehicles,
and command and control, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
systems. The Defense Department assesses that the number of Chinese ballistic missile
submarines has increased from 1 in 2001 to 6 in 2021 while projecting them to reach 8 of
these submarines by 2030 and 10 by 2040; China’s nuclear powered attack submarines have
increased from 6 in 2001 to 9 in 2021 while projecting them to reach 12 by 2030 and 16 by
2040; and the number of Chinese diesel attack submarines grew from 51 in 2001 to 56 in 2021
with this weapons platform numbers expected to decline to 55 by 2030 and 46 by 2040 as
Beijing places additional emphasis on its nuclear submarine capabilities. These emerging
nuclear submarines will include the Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine and the
Jin-class ballistic missile submarine armed with wake-homing torpedoes which are difficult
for surface ships to decoy and 12 JL-2 nuclear armed submarine ballistic missiles for each
Jin-class submarine.4

U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
The U.S. Navy’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion

codified by presidential Executive Order

Program (also known as Naval Reactors)

12344, encompasses all aspects of naval

currently consists of 11 aircraft carriers,

nuclear propulsion including research,

50 attack submarines, and 18 strategic

design, construction, testing, operation,

submarines with four of these being

maintenance, and ultimate disposition of

converted to a high-volume, precision

naval nuclear propulsion plants. Program

strike platform. Its history dates back into

responsibilities include all related facilities,

the 1950’s when it was part of the Atomic

radiological controls, environmental safety

Energy Commission before becoming

and health, and selection, training, and

part of the Department of Energy (DOE)

assignment of personnel through research

and has been part DOE’s National Nuclear

laboratories, nuclear-capable shipyards,

Security Administration (NNSA) since 2000.

equipment contractors, and suppliers, and

This program’s statutory governance,

training facilities.5
6
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The USS Nautilus became the U.S. first

Once selected for the Naval Nuclear

nuclear submarine in 1955 and subsequent

Propulsion Program, enlisted personnel

U.S. nuclear-powered submarines have

are assigned to Nuclear Field “A” School

enabled the U.S. to expand its warfighting

in Charleston, SC. They begin with a

potential to all undersea global corners

preparatory mathematics course and

with the capability to unleash deadly

receive extensive hands-on training in

firepower on potential adversaries.

equipment laboratories to teach required

Current U.S. nuclear submarines include

technical skills. After this initial training,

Los Angeles, Seawolf, and the emerging

a 24-week Nuclear Power School follows

Virginia class submarines. The Virginia

for acquiring basic academic knowledge

class was expected to begin construction

to understand nuclear propulsion plant

during Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 and begin

theory and operation. This curriculum

supporting strategic deterrent patrols in

is presented at first-year collegiate level

2031. Its nuclear reactor is designed to

and includes thermodynamics, reactor

last for a ship’s entire planned 33-year

principles, radiological fundamentals, and

lifecycle without refueling and to support

additional specialized subjects. Officers,

future technology upgrades and advanced

whom are all college graduates, also receive

payloads.

Nuclear Power School training in a 24-week

Individual Virginia class boats have
an estimated annual procurement cost
of approximately $3.45 billion, a planned

graduate level course including electrical
engineering, reactor dynamics, and other
courses.

procurement of 12 ships between FY 2020-

Following successful Nuclear Power

2025, and they are jointly built by General

School completion, hands-on operator

Dynamics Electric Board Division of Groton,

training is provided for enlisted personnel

CT and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington

and officers. 24 weeks of additional

Ingalls Industries Shipbuilding of Newport

classroom training and actual instructional

News, VA. Their payload capabilities

watchstanding experience occurs at

include Tomahawk cruise missiles and

moored training ships in Charleston or

other payloads including large-diameter

a land-based prototype in Schenectady,

unmanned underwater vehicles, up to

NY. Each student qualifies as a propulsion

24 large diameter vehicle launch tubes,

plant operator attaining extensive

acoustic and other improvements to

watchstanding experience and thorough

maintain design superiority over Chinese

knowledge of all propulsion plant systems

and Russian counterparts.

and their operating requirements. Directed

6

Historically over 142,000 sailors have
been trained and qualified as nuclear
propulsion plant operators. Achieving this
status requires rigorous and thorough
training and selection standards.

by experienced operator instructors,
students learn how to operate a naval
nuclear propulsion plant during normal
and potential casualty stations. Prior to
reporting aboard ship, they must qualify on
7
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their watch station on an operating reactor.7
Maintaining and enhancing high levels
of operation skill does not end with this
initial training. It requires continuous
augmentation as time passes. Operators
and officers must continually demonstrate
increasing proficiency as they qualify and
serve on more demanding watch stations.
Shore training facilities provide operators
with advanced training in equipment repair

▶ The first chemical cleaning
process for nuclear plant steam
generators.
▶ Ultrasonic inspection methods
for evaluating the material
status of reactor vessels and
major components.
▶ Extensive use of sold-state
electronics for instrumentation,
control, and power distribution.9

and operation. All officers must achieve
Engineering Officer qualification by passing

Whatever direction Australia decides

a comprehensive examination administered

on how many nuclear submarines it

by Naval Reactor Headquarters. An

will purchase from either the US or

additional advanced training program

UK in subsequent years it will face

in nuclear propulsion plant operations

problems currently impacting the nuclear

is conducted at this site for aspiring

submarine industry in both countries.

commanding officers of nuclear-powered

U.S. industry problems have been

warships, prototypes, and Moored Training

extensively documented in reports from

Ships and is required more any officer

the Government Accountability Office (GAO)

taking command of a U.S. Navy nuclear

and Congressional Budget Office (CBO). A

powered ship.

January 2021 GAO report noted the Columbia

8

Naval nuclear program accomplishments
have been applied downstream on a global
scale with multiple civilian applications
along with other historical, current, and
emerging military education and training
requirements including:
▶ Designing large pressurizedwater reactor components and
cladding for large pressure
vessels.
▶ Containment concepts and
refueling techniques for power
reactors.
▶ A system for preventing damage
to a reactor core if failures occur
in the cooling system.

class submarine faces challenges with
lead contractor Electric Boat’s computeraided software tool which may impede
construction because Electric Boat has
been late in completing design products.
There have also been quality problems with
supplier material caused delays during early
construction including missile tubes with
defective welding. Shipbuilder expansion
of outsourcing to suppliers has produced
further delays in quality assurance
oversight at supplier facilities.10
GAO recommendations for rectifying these
deficiencies include:
▶ The Secretary of the Navy
providing information from
8

2021 FORCES Team AUKUS Agreement

the August 2020 milestone

delays and challenges leaving little or no

decision-making authority

margin for further delays without risking the

meeting. Such information

nuclear deterrent. Report findings note that

should include updated cost

the Ohio class submarines have 24 missile

and schedule information and

tubes but only 20 of these can employ

reviewing of the independent

submarine launched ballistic missiles,

cost assessment and

and the persistence of continuing delays

assessment of the program’s

in Ohio submarine mid-life maintenance

ability to reduce development

periods which may make the Navy unable to

risks.

produce additional submarines if directed

▶ The Secretary of the Navy

to do so by U.S. Strategic Command, while

ensuring the Navy includes

also adversely impacting Columbia and

an update on the status of

Virginia class submarine construction and

critical supplier readiness as

costs.12

part of its statutorily mandated
2018 Defense Authorization
Act requirement to report
on Columbia class program
performance construction and
design goals.
▶ The Secretary of the Navy
ensuring that the Supervisor
of Shipbuilding, Conversion,
and Repair (SUPSHIP) work
with Columbia class program
management to determine
whether additional materials
require government source
inspections and whether such
inspections require taking
action to ensure the shipbuilder
includes inspection clauses in
supplier contracts.11
A May 2021 GAO report indicates that
Defense Department efforts to modernize
the sea, land, and air components of the
nuclear triad specified in the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review have experienced repeated

In January 2022, GAO released a report
documenting problems with Defense
Department facility sustainment funding.
It revealed that aircraft, submarine, and
ship acquisition initiatives are regularly
prioritized over facility sustainment due
to their perceived greater importance in
performing Navy assigned missions. This
produced a deferred Defense Department
maintenance backload of $137 billion in FY
2020 with DOD officials expecting these
maintenance backlogs to increase in the
future.13
Another January 2022 GAO assessment
revealed that while DOD and NNSA
have begun implementing some risk
management processes within their nuclear
portfolios, they have failed to establish
joint processes for periodically identifying,
analyzing, and reporting information on
these risks to stakeholders including the
nuclear triad’s weapons and delivery
platforms. Such interdependencies may
produce additional risk to individual
program schedules and costs. GAO
9
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also determined that if Columbia class

or reviewed comparing

submarines are not fielded by FY 2031

proposed prioritization against

or if subsequent deliveries planed

operational requirements along

through FY 2040 are delayed the Navy

with available funding and set

will have insufficient submarines to meet

resource capacity plans based

U.S. Strategic Command requirements;

on portfolio prioritization.14

assessed that DOD had not prioritized the

Further problems in potential

Nuclear Enterprise Portfolio; that the Navy

construction of additional submarines for

requested additional FY 2022 funding for

AUKUS were documented in a February

the Columbia due to cost increases; and

2022 GAO report on Navy ship maintenance.

noted variations in NNSA’s Office of Defense

This assessment revealed that between FY

Programs program prioritizing.

2015-2020, that the Navy spent an annual

GAO recommendations for DOD and NNSA
in this report include:
▶ The DOD and the NNSA
Administrator establishing
a joint risk management
process to periodically identify,
analyze, and respond to risks
affecting the nuclear enterprise
and reporting to relevant
stakeholders on those risks and
applicable mitigation efforts.
▶ DOD establishing prioritization
criteria for DOD Nuclear
Enterprise programs, projects,
and activities, including
program account costs,
benefits, and alternatives from
recurring risk analyses and
reviewing these prioritization
criteria when a new component
is introduced or during a

average of $2.1 billion on high priority
submarine maintenance and completed only
191 of 414 (46%) of submarine intermediate
maintenance periods totaling 2,525 days
of maintenance delays. This report also
revealed that the Navy did not collect
several data categories for submarines,
surface ships, and aircraft carriers including
planned and actual period maintenance
costs making the Navy unable to track and
improve intermediate maintenance period
performance.
Comparable workforce and completion
constraints in the U.S. defense industry
were also identified in a February 2022
report by DOD’s Office of the Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.
Four challenges identified by shipyard
crews and recorded by GAO in timely
performance of intermediate maintenance
periods include:

strategic review.
▶ Following DOD Nuclear
Enterprise priority criteria
establishment, DOD should
apply the criteria whenever
portfolio changes are proposed
10
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Crew/Workforce Shortages

Personnel shortages and not replacing
personnel absent for medical/mental health
reasons. Personnel lacking requisite skills.

High Operational Tempo/Scheduling

Includes long work days underway and
in port. Workload and schedule demands
result in sailors staying onboard in port and
cancelling leave.

Limited maintenance/repair training

Poorly qualified trainers and training on
obsolete equipment or equipment not used
aboard ships. Limited capacity and reduced
content in Navy schools and relying on onthe-job training.

Parts & Materials Shortages

Including inability to identify or locate
correct parts, difficulty obtaining obsolete
parts or equipment, cannibalizing items on
one ship for another, lacking tools to perform
maintenance, receiving refurbished parts,
non-working parts, and wrong parts.15

GAO recommends for ameliorating these
constraints include:
▶ The Navy ensuring shorebased maintenance providers
and fleet/type commanders
establish and implement
procedures to collect and
analyze complete and
reliable data on intermediate
maintenance performance for
submarines, ships, and aircraft
carriers. Such data should
include planned and actual
start and completion dates,
costs, and causes of delays
in completing maintenance
periods.

▶ The Navy establishing a single
entity to address challenges
affecting intermediate plans for
submarines, ships, and aircraft
carriers.
▶ The Navy ensuring shorebased maintenance providers
and fleet/type commanders
implement a mechanism for
sharing maintenance best
practices and lessons learned.
▶ The Navy ensuring that naval
maintenance-related strategic
planning initiatives include
problems with intermediate
maintenance period
performance.16
11
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Meeting potential production and

condition of individual submarines due

sustainment requirements for Australian

to different operating conditions or

nuclear submarines will be challenging

deferred maintenance and the extent

given these long-standing problems.

of modernization the Navy decides to

Such difficulties in U.S. nuclear submarine

incorporate into a particular DSRA. The

construction and capacity have been

number of labor days at public shipyards

documented in 2019 and 2021 Congressional

has increased from about 20,000 labor days

Budget Office (CBO) reports. A 2019 CBO

in the 1990s to over 60,000 in the 2010s.19

analysis comparing submarine costs at
public private shipyards found between
1993-2017 submarine maintenance costs
were 31% cheaper at private shipyards.
And that the average costs of Docking
Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA)
overhauls for Los Angeles-class submarines
had risen from $20 million in the 1990s to
approximately $50 million in the 2010s with
29 of these DSRA overhauls done at private
shipyards and 117 at public shipyards.

17

Further concerns over the U.S.’ ability to
meet potential construction and delivery
requirements with potential Australian
nuclear submarines were documented in
a March 2021 CBO report. This analysis
noted that the four public shipyards have
experienced delays of several years in
performing submarine maintenance. These
have resulted in Virginia class submarines
having returned to operations nine months
later than expected and Los Angeles

Maintenance and construction costs

class submarines returning four and a

must be factored into the U.S.’ potential

half months later than expected. Such

future ability to produce nuclear submarines

delays have caused submarines to miss

for Australia. The Navy owns or operates

deployments or had sea deployments

four public shipyards at the Norfolk Navy

shortened reducing the number of

Shipyard in Portsmouth, VA; the Portsmouth

submarines the Navy can put to sea idling

Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME; the Puget

expensive ships and their skilled crews.

Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, WA;

Such maintenance delays are expected

and the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in Pearl

to continue and exceed naval shipyard

Harbor, HI. Most of the nuclear submarine

capacity in 25 of the next 30 years. 20

work at these shipyards is performed
by federal civilian employees. Private
shipyards possessing the ability to build
and maintain naval nuclear ships include
Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport
News, VA and Electric Boat in Groton, CT.18

Required maintenance performed in
shipyards has increased and the Navy has
not hired enough workers to keep pace
with this enhanced workload. Over the
twelve previous years attack submarine
overhauls have typically taken 20-40%

Additional factors influencing shipyard

longer than planned in terms of the number

maintenance costs include cost variance

of labor days required to complete the work

for overhauls in the same year and at the

and the time required for ships to spend

same shipyard due to varying material

in shipyards. Work such as this requires
12
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security clearances which takes time and

despite these problems. Concern over

several years are required to train and

the U.S.’ ability to meet the requirements

apprentice workers. The Navy has also

of AUKUS and overall defense industry

reached its goal of having nearly 37,000 new

sustainability and supply chain security

workers at public shipyards and taken steps

is not guaranteed and was the subject of

to improve productivity including shipyard

a June 2021 interagency report directed

repair and redesign. CBO also projects

by President Joe Biden in Executive Order

that submarine maintenance demand will

14017. 23 It is possible, however, that

exceed labor supply over the next few

Canberra may decide to use British nuclear

decades and that the Coronavirus pandemic

submarine parts to build its nascent nuclear

contributed to a 5% decrease in shipyard

submarine capability. It is now helpful to

productivity during 2020-2021.

look at Britain’s nuclear submarine force to

21

CBO mentioned four possible options
the Navy could pursue in its emerging
submarine maintenance plans including

learn more about its historical background
and present and emerging strengths and
weaknesses.

improving forecasting to update class
plans to more accurately reflect the actual
duration of maintenance events; adding
2,500 workers to boost maintenance

BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

capacity or hire the same number of

The United Kingdom has been one of the

workers for private shipyards which CBO

world’s nuclear weapons powers since

estimates would cost $275 million per year.

it first tested these weapons in 1952 in

This must recognize that hiring and training

Australia and in 1957 at Malden Island in the

shipyard workers takes about five years

South Pacific Ocean. This would facilitate

from when such hiring is authorized to

multiple decades of Anglo-American

hiring new workers, getting them security

cooperation on nuclear weapons subjects. 24

clearances, and receiving such training to

A 1958 treaty between London and

be sufficiently productive. If this can be

Washington saw these two countries agree

started soon it can be accomplished before

to cooperate on using nuclear energy for

the nuclear submarine fleet grows in the

mutual defense matters and this agreement

2030s and 2040s. A final option would

would be reinforced and expanded by

be reducing the submarine fleet’s size

subsequent agreements over ensuing

by approximately five attack submarines

decades. These later agreements strove

to equal shipyard maintenance capacity

incorporate changing nuclear weapon

by acquiring older submarines early or

technological developments and evolving

purchasing new submarines.

nuclear threat environments into British and

22

The U.S. will, undoubtedly, play a key role
in ensuring Australia’s ability to acquire and

U.S. military strategic planning. 25
While the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal

maintain nuclear submarine under AUKUS
13
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consists of land, air, and sea-based

maintains in-service submarines at naval

platforms (often called the Triad), the British

bases in Faslane and Plymouth support.

nuclear weapons arsenal has consisted of

Approximately 2,500 British companies

a submarine based force since April 1969.

are involved in maintaining the British

This force, consisting of four submarines,

nuclear deterrent’s supply chain supporting

is called the Continuous At Sea Deterrent)

thousands of jobs.27

(CASD) and consists of at least one Royal
Navy nuclear-armed ballistic missile
submarine patrolling the seas undetected
ready to respond to the most extreme
threats facing the UK. These forces are
capable of firing at several days notice
and does not target its missiles at any
country. British government policy is to be
ambiguous about when, how, and at what
scale it will use such weapons to ensure
their effectiveness is not undermined while
striving to complicate potential aggressor’s
calculations. Only the Prime Minister can
authorize the use of nuclear weapons. 26
Components of Britain’s nuclear weapons
program include the Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE) in Aldermaston
and Blacknest near Reading whose
approximately 1,700 strong workforce is
responsible for assuring, building, and
replacing British nuclear warheads, the
HM Naval Base at Clyde, Scotland which
maintains the CASD, possesses a workforce
which will increase from 6,800-8,200 and
saw the 2020 opening of a £1.6 billion
($2,107,968 billion) investment program
in a Submarine Center of Specialization.
Submarine construction occurs at the
BAE Systems Shipyard in Barrow which
provides training and apprenticeships at the
Submarine Academy. Nuclear propulsion
systems are manufactured by Rolls Royce
in Derby and Babcock supports and

Britain is initiating the process of
developing the Dreadnought nuclear
submarine class to replace the Vanguard
nuclear submarine class beginning in
2028. This decision to retain a nuclear
submarine capability was affirmed by a 2013
governmental review of nuclear deterrence
options and by a July 18, 2016 House of
Commons vote of 472-117 to maintain a
nuclear deterrent beyond the early 2030s by
building four Dreadnoughts. 28
These four Dreadnoughts are projected
to have a crew of 130, 17,200 tons
displacement, be 152.9 meters long (501
feet seven inches), and have a 30-year
lifespan. A December 17, 2020 British
Government report to Parliament noted that
the Dreadnought program had achieved
95% of its pre-Covid pandemic output; the
2020 awarding by BAE Systems of a £330
million ($432,676,200) contract to Thales
UK to manufacture the sonar system for
the four Dreadnoughts; that missile tube
quality shortfalls which are part of the
Common Missile Department have impacted
the supply chain and delayed delivery;
and that Dreadnought program lifetime
costs have been estimated at £31 billion
($40,841,880,000) with an additional £10
billion ($13,174,800,880,000) set aside for
contingency costs; and that cumulative
expenditures of £8.5 billion ($11,198,580,000)
had occurred as of March 31, 2020 with £1.6
14
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billion ($2,107,968,000) being spent during

costs and schedules through improved

financial year 2019-2020.

project controls, stronger collaboration and

29

Despite these positive developments,
other British government assessments of
Britain’s nuclear submarine program reveal
significant problems which may adversely
impact its domestic programs as well as
potential support of a nascent Australian
nuclear submarine capability. A May
2018 National Audit Office (NAO) review of
British defense nuclear capabilities noted
that MOD expects to spend £5.2 billion
($6,817,928,000) on the Defense Nuclear

information sharing, and more rigorous
oversight; asserted that MOD does not
have enough qualified and experienced
personnel in nuclear engineering but
noted that MOD was developing skills
programming and consolidated training in
Scotland; and that it needs to coordinate
plans to maintain submarines while
also decommissioning and dismantling
submarines leaving service.31
A 2019 NAO report documented that

Enterprise during 2018-2019 representing

while MOD has pledged to dispose of

14% of its overall budget with this including

nuclear submarines “as soon as reasonably

£1.8 billion ($2,360,052,000) on submarine

practicable,” it has failed to dispose of

procurement and support, £1.4 billion

the 20 submarines retired since 1980.

($1,835,596,000 on missiles and warheads,

This has produced a situation in which

£790 million ($1,035,800,600) on propulsion

MOD stores twice as many submarines

systems, and £220 ($288,450,800) million on

as it operates with seven of these craft

infrastructure management. NAO also noted

being in storage longer than they were in

that the 2015 Strategic Defense and Security

service. Government promises to dispose

Review (SDSR) strove to end governance

submarines began in 1995 with the first

and decision-making fragmentation by

submarine dismantling only occurring

creating the Defence Nuclear Organisation

in 2016 with the cumulative costs of

(DNO) and Submarine Delivery Agency (SDA)

maintaining and storing these submarines

to establish a single accountability point for

being £500 million ($655,570,000).

nuclear submarine production.

Disposing these submarines requires

30

This assessment went on to note that
MOD has had to cut costs, identify efficiency
savings, and reprogram work to keep the
Enterprise affordable which has included
achieving £3 billion ($3.933,420,000) of
efficiency savings over the next ten years
and delaying development of an Astute
attack class submarine replacement by two
years. NAO also noted that SDA is trying to

multiple and interrelated tasks including
defueling-related projects at Devonport,
submarine dismantling at Rosyth and
Devonport including remove radioactive
submarine parts, and relying on the single
contractor Babcock International Group
in Babcock to carry out defueling and
dismantling requirements.32
Additional NAO documented deficiencies

work with contractors to address past poor

in MOD nuclear submarine defueling and

performance in nuclear submarine contract

dismantling includes not defueling any
15
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submarines since 2004 and not having a

The projected deployment date for these

fully funded plan to restart defueling; an

submarines is the early 2030s and they will

11 year delay in a defueling facility project

be named HMS Dreadnought, HMS Valiant,

with a £100 million ($131,114,000) (57%)

HMS Warspite, and HMS King George VI.

cost increase which has produced wider

The Dreadnoughts are to be built into 16

cost, risk and dock space ramifications

units with three mega units “Aft, Mid, and

with MOD paying an estimated £12 million

Forward” to shorten the anticipated overall

($15,733,680) annually to maintain and store

build timeframe. Dreadnought funding will

nine fueled submarines at Devonport with

come from MOD’s core equipment budget

these costs also including requirement

and program costs may reach £41 billion

to inspect, clean, and repaint stored

($53,746,740,000) making it one of the

submarines at least every 15 years; MOD

most expensive government projects with

needing to restart waste transportation

its potential costs doubling those of the

procurement after not receiving viable

London Crossrail commuter train project

bids resulting in an additional two year

and triple the costs of the 2012 London

delay; noted that MOD was now striving to

Summer Olympics.35

completing defueling projects in 2023; and
asserted that MOD still does not have a fully
developed plan to dispose of Vanguard,
Astute, and Dreadnought-class submarines
which have different nuclear reactor types.
The projected conclusion of the submarine
dismantling program is targeted to be the
2060s.33
A March 2021 House of Commons Library

A March 2021 NAO report on British
defense equipment funding contended
MOD had not provided sufficient funding
for planned construction projects to
enable them to be completed; established
divergent Dreadnought funding
arrangements due to program size and
complexity; praised MOD for taking a more
prudent funding approach on high-risk

report noted that 85% of BAE’s supply chain

programs such as Dreadnought; and

for the Dreadnought-class submarines

hypothesized that HM Treasury would

will be in the UK potentially involving 850

provide additional funding for Dreadnought

British companies. However, it is unclear

to offset cost increases arising from pension

how much of overall program value will

changes and adverse foreign exchange

be spent in the UK and how much will be

movements.36

spent overseas with BAE contracting with a
French supplier for required specialized high
strength steel. In addition, MOD confirmed
in December 2020 that it had spent £1 billion
($1,311,140,000) of its program contingency
fund with an additional £1.3 billion
($1,704,482,000) available for the 2021-2025
time frame.34

Additional funding and staffing for
the Dreadnought-class submarine must
also incorporate broader funding and
strategic requirements for the Royal Navy
as demonstrated in a December 7, 2021
report by the House of Commons Defence
Committee. This document began by noting
that the 2020s will be a decade of significant
16
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risk due to an increasingly unstainable

sentiment was also echoed by other

international security environment with

witnesses. The Committee expressed

particular vulnerability occurring in the

concern that Vanguard-class submarines

maritime domain due to the emergence of

will have to operate well beyond their

more assertive state adversaries, gray zone

planned lifespans and that Vanguard delays

warfare, and technological risk. It noted the

make it imperative that Dreadnought be

Royal Navy is being tasked with taking on

delivered on time and that MOD must brief

increasing responsibilities including taking

the committee annually on submarine

the lead in Britain’s persistent engagement

availability to ensure program security and

policy and Indo-Pacific tilt.

effective parliamentary scrutiny.39

37

This document proceeded to castigate

The committee also expressed concern

the government for capping naval and

about historical and contemporary MOD

defense spending while asserting that

shipbuilding procurement problems

increased defense spending is required to

including the relatively slow rate at which

address current and future naval capability

these vessels are produced in the UK;

requirements. It noted the financial costs

potential labor shortages stemming from

of maintaining aging submarine and

a large number of concurrent projects and

surface vessels while calling for increasing

an insufficiently skilled workforce in marine

the numbers of submarines to reflect the

welding, plating and fabrication, pipe

increasing importance of undersea warfare

fitting, and mechanical fitting; and work

along with increasing spending, personnel,

concentration in particular yards leading to

and support shipping for this domain.

the risk of knock-on delays.40

Testifying before this committee U.S. Naval
War College Professor Jonathan Caverley
maintained:

Committee recommendations for
rectifying these deficiencies include
MOD emulating the U.S. Department of

…we need as many attack submarines

Defense by providing Parliament with

as possible. Submarines are capable of

an annual shipbuilding plan including

doing two things. They are very good at

the number of ships planned to enter

anti-submarine warfare….Submarines are

and leave service each year in the next

also useful for getting inside [areas that are

30 years and that Dreadnought program

within range of enemy weapons].

leaders provide the committee within an

38

First Sea Lord Admiral Tony Radakin told
the committee that it is critically important
that the Royal Navy be able to work with
allied navies such as the U.S., India, Japan,
and Australia through arrangements such
as AUKUS and that such interoperability
will become increasingly important. This

annual report on program developments
within six months and annually; MOD
being honest with the public about the
deteriorating international security
situation with particular emphasis on the
Indo-Pacific, the naval capabilities needed
to protect Britain in this environment,
and the funding required to deliver such
17

2021 FORCES Team AUKUS Agreement

capabilities; and the emergence of threats

deployment; preparing an annual report

such as hypersonic missiles. Additional

on fleet availability and shipbuilding

committee recommendations include

plans; reaffirming existing MOD policy

recognizing the increasing importance

not to comment on submarine availability

of the underwater domain in future naval

capabilities based on concern that this

warfare; increasing the attack submarine

would compromise national security; and

fleet’s size; determining whether future

work to assess professional submarine

submarine design should include horizontal

engineering workforce skills.42

or vertical missile launch systems while
retaining land attack missile capability;
increasing cooperation with France
and interoperability with Indo-Pacific
partners; and delivering existing Astute
class submarines while recognizing that
submarine delivery problems area prevalent
with Australian and US submarine fleets.41
The British Government’s response to

Britain has been involved in trilateral
Joint Steering Group meetings to begin
the process of implementing AUKUS. On
December 9, 2021 the Joint Steering Group
for Advanced Capabilities met at the
Pentagon and on December 14, 2021 the
Joint Steering Group for Australia’s NuclearPowered Submarine Program met at the
Pentagon. The first group saw participants

the House of Commons Defence Committee

identify collaboration opportunities on

report was published on February 22,

critical capabilities and technologies,

2022. It agreed with the committee’s

commit to deepen and expand cooperation

assessment of the increasingly complex and

and interoperability; and finalize an

volatile Indo-Pacific international security

advanced capabilities work related program

environment; announced its ongoing

by early 2022. Particular emphasis was

public engagement efforts to promote

placed on enhancing cyber capabilities,

awareness of the need to increase defense

artificial intelligence, quantum technologies,

spending by referencing its 2021 Defence

and additional undersea capabilities.

Command Paper and 2020 Integrated

The second group affirmed the AUKUS

Operating Concept which include submarine

commitment to enable Australian nuclear

capabilities as critical national security

submarine capability at the earliest possible

strategic components; acknowledged

date and determined subsequent steps over

committee advice on future submarine

an 18-month consultation period on the best

attack capabilities without committing to

way for Australia to achieve this capability

specific class sizes, weapons system fits, or

and establish an enduring nuclear

wider capabilities; stressed the importance

submarine program. Both of these groups

of enhancing Indo-Pacific interoperability

also examined how to make sure AUKUS

with the U.S. and allied partners; the First

upholds these countries long-standing

Sea Lord’s desire to reduce the time ships

global nonproliferation activities including

and submarines spend being repaired and

continuing close consultation with the

increasing the time they’re available for

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
18
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and their ongoing support of the Nuclear

Submarines have been part of the Royal

Nonproliferation Treaty. This commitment to

Australian Navy (RAN) for over a century.

global nonproliferation was documented in

In 1914, the RAN acquired two British-built

a March 10, 2022 statement to IAEA.

E Class submarines. The following year

43

Enhanced British cooperation with
Australia occurred during a January
2022 visit by Foreign Secretary Liz Truss.
During her four-day visit, Truss met with
leading Australian officials including
Prime Minister Morrison, Foreign Minister
Marise Payne, and Defence Minister Peter
Dutton and discussed increasing British
trade, economic, and security cooperation
with Australia. She also warned about
the growing dependence of AsianPacific countries on China and signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with then
South Australian Premier Steven Marshall

Australian submarines launched successful
attacks against Ottoman targets in the Sea
of Marmora during the Gallipoli campaign.
Between 1919-1929, eight J-class submarines
were given to RAN by the British Admiralty;
three Royal Navy submarines at HMAS
Penguin in Sydney between 1949-1969; RAN
deployed six Oberon class submarines in
the 1960s and 1970s, and six Collins class
submarines were deployed in the 1980s and
capable of quietly covering large distances
quickly and quietly at depths exceeding
180 meters. Throughout their history these
programs have experienced managerial and

to enhance ties with South Australian

operational successes and failures.45

space, cyber, and green technologies

Unlike the American and British

industries. This agreement is also important

experience with nuclear submarines,

because South Australia is the home of

Australian submarines have been

Australian naval shipbuilding and advanced

conventionally powered and while

manufacturing including Australia’s

Australia has nuclear science capabilities

submarine construction infrastructure. A

and government agencies regulating

February 16, 2022 virtual meeting between

nuclear energy, there has been strong

Morrison and British Prime Minister

sentiment against nuclear energy within

Johnson noted that on February 8, 2022 that

this country. This is reflected by two laws

an Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion

the 1998 Australian Radiation Protection

Agreement entered into force making it

and Nuclear Safety Act and the 1999

possible for the UK and US to share naval

Environmental Protection and Biodiversity

nuclear propulsion information with

Conservation Act. These laws sought to

Australia.44

prohibit construction or operation of a
nuclear fuel fabrication plant, nuclear power
plant, an enrichment plant, or reprocessing

AUSTRALIAN CONVENTIONAL
AND POTENTIAL NUCLEAR
SUBMARINES

facility. A 2019 Australian parliamentary
committee report recommended allowing
nuclear energy generation through small
modular nuclear reactors following results
19
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of a technology assessment and with the

announced on September 24, 2021 that it

consent of the local population.

looked forward to providing its nuclear

46

Enhancing Australian submarine
construction capability and reliability
and its domestic industrial base at the
Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide,

expertise to working with other Australian
stakeholders, the UK and U.S. to implement
AUKUS in subsequent years by focusing on
safety, training, operation, maintenance,

South Australia were prime features of the

disposal, and environmental protection.48

government’s 2016 Naval Shipbuilding Plan

The Australian Nuclear Submarine Task

and a supplemental 2019 document both of

Force (NSTF) is a Department of Defence

which emphasized conventional powered

entity consisting of members from the

submarines. An objective of this latter

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

document was creating 12 Attack class

the Attorney General’s Department,

submarines producing 1,100 direct and 1,700

Department of Education, Skills, and

indirect jobs. This emphasis on submarines

Employment, ANSTO, and the Australian

increasing importance in Australia’s

Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety

maritime environment lead Australia to

Agency. This task force, led by Vice Admiral

sign a contract with France in 2016 for that

Jonathan Mead, is charged with identifying

country to provide Australia with diesel-

educational and skills directions for the

electric Barracuda submarines worth $A55

Australian nuclear submarine workforce

billion over a 25 year period. This contract

to have the necessary skills to initiate and

would be cancelled by Australia in 2021

sustain a nuclear submarine program.49

causing a rift between these two countries

This task force notes that justifications for

and based, in part, on U.S. concerns that this

Australia acquiring nuclear submarines

contract would weaken ties between the

include:

U.S. and Australia on Indo-Pacific security
matters and that Australia needed nuclear
powered submarines to more effectively
respond to China’s ongoing military buildup
and assertiveness in this region.47
These factors all contributed to
Australia joining AUKUS in September

▶ Submarines are an essential
part of Australian naval
capability by providing
strategic advantage in terms
of surveillance and protecting
maritime approaches.
▶ Their stealth, range, endurance,

2021. The Australian Government promptly

and powerful weapons gives

established a task force to engage in a 18

submarines the ability to

month investigation to determine the best

operate and strike without

means for Australia to acquire nuclear

warning. They are highly

submarines. The Australian Nuclear Science

versatile and capable of striking

and Technology Organisation (ANSTO),

multiple targets, collecting

which manages existing Australian nuclear

intelligence, conducting mine

facilities at Lucas Heights in Sydney,

warfare, and supporting special
20
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operations.
▶ As a three ocean nation relying

compared to conventional submarines;
nuclear submarines can deploy unmanned

on maritime trade and lines of

underwater vehicles and carry more

communication, submarines

advanced weapons and larger numbers of

contribute to protecting

weapons; they can operate in contested

Australia and its national

areas with lower risk of detection and deter

interests.

actions hostile to Australian interests; and

▶ They deter aggression and deny

nuclear submarines are the only option for

adversarial use of the sea by

meeting Australian defense requirements

holding them at-risk far from

over subsequent decades.51

Australia improving Australian
access to and free use of the
sea.
▶ Submarine defense capability
is a combination of system
of systems crossing multiple
domains using advanced
technology.
▶ Such deterrence capability is
a combination of layering and
creating systems spanning air,
sea, surface, land, cyber, and
systems to deliver an effect
allowing Australia to shape,
deter, and respond to threats.50
The NSTF also notes that nuclear
submarines are superior to conventional
powered submarines by noting that the
deteriorating security environment since
2016 requires reconsideration of that year’s
decision to acquire conventional Attack
class submarines; Australia needs the
best submarine capability for subsequent
decades; conventional submarines regularly
needing to raise their masts above the
water surface to recharge their batteries;
nuclear powered submarines possessing
superior stealth, speed, maneuverability,
survivability, and almost limitless endurance

NSTF will use this 18 month period
to determine which is the best way to
purchase at least eight conventionally
armed nuclear powered submarines from
the UK or US including examining submarine
design, construction, safety, operation,
maintenance, disposal, regulation, training,
environmental protection, installations and
infrastructure, industrial base capacity,
workforce, and force structure.52
Australia’s potential ability to incorporate
nuclear submarines into the RAN fleet by
the 2030’s can be assessed by examining
reports on Australian submarine program
management performance produced by
the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO),
Australian parliamentary committees, the
government-funded Australian Strategic
Policy Institute (ASPI), and RAN. A January
2020 ANAO report on Australia’s Future
Submarine Program (FSP) observed that the
Defense Department (Defence) had adopted
risk management methodologies to identify
and assess program risk while noting that
this department had identified a more than
three year FSP delay would create a gap
in RAN submarine capability. An ANAO
conclusion was that FSP was experiencing
a nine-month delay in the design phase
21
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against pre-design contract estimates

the arrival of AUKUS as a key component of

resulting in extending two major contracted

its oversight scrutiny of FSP financial and

milestones. Consequently, Defence

management performance. ANAO noted that

cannot demonstrate that its $A 396 million

cancellation of purchase of 12 conventional

($296,823,780,000) FSP design expenditure

Attack class submarines stemmed from

has been effective in achieving two major

deterioration in Australia’s strategic

program design milestones and that

environment and was not related to Attack

design expenditure on the FSP’s material

class submarine program performance.

component represented 47% of all program

This assessment also noted that the

spending as of September 2019.

2020-21 FSB budget was $A 488.7 million

53

Criticism of governmental spending
and the management performance of
government programs is common in
democratic countries. Such criticism of

($366,307,529,000) and that the long-term
total approved budget for this project was
$A 5,655.4 billion ($4,239,033,347).55
Concern over management of the

FSP was reflected in a November 16, 2020

FSP program and domestic Australian

letter from opposition Labour party Deputy

political contentiousness between the

Leader and Shadow Minister for Defence

governing center-right Liberal/National

Richard Marles to Auditor-General Grant

Party and the leftist opposition Labour

Hehir. Marles maintained that significant

Party were reflected in two interim reports

increases in the FSP program were withheld

issued in May 2021 and February 2022

from the public and Parliament for several

by the Australian Parliament’s Senate

years with Marles contending that the $A

Economic References Committee. This

50 billion ($37,477,750,000) cost quoted by

report questioned why Australia initially

the government had risen to $A 80 billion

contracted with France to produce new

($59,964,400,000) by 2019 while expressing

submarines in 2016 when other possible

concern that the government had knowingly

contractors were Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp

used incorrect figures in public statements.

Marine Systems and Japan’s Soryu class

In his December 11, 2020 response to Marles,

boats.56

Hehir noted that he had written to the
Departments of Defence and Finance to
seek additional information about FSB cost
estimation practices. Hehir’s March 19, 2021
letter to Marles said these departments
2020 advice to Parliament was based on
Defence maintained financial information
and that ANAO would include FSP as a
proposed performance audit in its future
work program.54
A December 13, 2021 ANAO report noted

The committee report also expressed
displeasure at what it considers to be
Defence opaqueness, obfuscation, and
lack of accountability concerning naval
shipbuilding expenditure. Examples of
committee concerns included a $A 38.5
billion ($28,857,867,500) discrepancy
between naval shipbuilding figures
reported in 2015 and projected in 2020; the
committee failing to receive documents
on naval industrial shipbuilding capacity
22
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or redacted documents on this from the

the May 2021 report about Defence candor

Defence and this department providing

and governmental and shipbuilding

misleading answers to committee

industry financial management. It noted

questions.

former coalition Prime Minister Malcolm

57

Recommendations made by committee
opposition members in this report included
Defence and government reporting to
Parliament on discussions undertaken with
alternative submarine builders on successor
boats to Collins-class submarines; providing
unredacted versions of renegotiated
contracts to the Senate Economics
References Committee; and Defence
examining how it trains its staff to be aware
of its obligations to enable Parliament to
be answerable to the Australian public
through providing information assisting
parliamentary oversight activities. Coalition
Senators on this committee dissented
from report findings by recommending
that it is not in the national interest of the
of participating countries or companies
for detailed contractual information to

Turnbull calling the decision to cancel
the submarine contract with France
“a diplomatic debacle of the first order
and the consequences being that it has
undermined Australia’s honour, security,
and sovereignty.;” questioned Australia’s
ability to handle the infrastructure required
of a nuclear submarine industry including
long-term storage of spent reactor fuel
of high-level waste; the possibility that
the costs of a nuclear submarine program
could be $A116-171 billion ($86,948,380,000$128,173,905,000); that it might not be
until 2038-2040 that Australia could begin
receiving nuclear submarines; and that
Australia may want the ships to be built
in Australia for domestic political reasons
instead of the UK or US.59
Recommendations made by committee

be publicly released; they disagreed that

opposition members included stressing

Defence officials had been deficient in

bipartisan support for AUKUS to ensure

disclosing information to the committee

delivery of this critical material capability

due to its national security relevance;

while also urging the government establish

and that the government must pursue

an bipartisan process to ensure AUKUS

continuing and active engagement with

partnership implementation and timely

Australia’s shipbuilding industry to achieve

delivery of AUKUS objectives and military

and robust and efficient procurement

capability; that Defence provide in

process to produce a vibrant domestic

publication a suitable format explaining

naval shipbuilding industry to meet national

discrepancies between 2016 and 2020 FSP

security requirements which they maintain

funding totals; and Defense reporting back

were neglected by Labour governments.58

to Parliament on its progress in training

A supplemental February 2022 interim
report by this committee noted the
initiation of the AUKUS program reinforced
conclusions and concerns expressed in

staff on the importance of providing timely
and transparent information to Parliament
and the public.60
In their dissenting report, Coalition
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committee members said the majority

needed for Australia to build and maintain

report did not give fair or reasonable

a nuclear submarine infrastructure is

recognition to the positive steps they

provided in a December 2021 study by the

believe the Coalition Government has

government-funded Australian Strategic

taken concerning Australian sovereign

Policy Institute (ASPI). This organization

shipbuilding capability. They described

noted that this would probably be the

AUKUS as a change in Australian strategy,

largest and most complex construction

but not capability, while noting that the

project in Australian history facing

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

enormous challenges, costs, and risks;

(ASEAN) would remain critical to Australian

require at least two decades; and tens

regional engagement. These Senators

of billions of dollars in sunk costs before

also noted that AUKUS is also a framework

Australia has a useful nuclear-powered

facilitating deeper practical cooperation to

military capability. It will require NSTF

develop leading-edge military capabilities

deciding to choose the UK Astute class

and technologies ensuring Australia

submarine or the US Virginia class

remains a major Indo-Pacific security

submarine and whether the UK and US have

partner. Additionally, Coalition committee

the capability assist Australia in delivering

members noted the government intends

military effects, industrial base capacity,

for the future fleet of nuclear submarines

and workforce training.62

to be built at South Australia’s Osborne
Naval Shipyard, that ongoing naval
shipbuilding, including submarines, will
occur at the Australian Maritime Complex
in Henderson, Western Australia, and that
the Coalition Government is spending far
more on defense than the previous Labour
Government. Coalition committee member
recommendations included contending that
the Coalition Government regularly provides
defence briefings to relevant opposition
members including the Shadow Minister
of Defence; that the government and
Defence are subject to proper parliamentary
oversight through the budget process,
parliamentary committees, and Question
Time; and that Defence has been consistent
in answering questions about the FSP.

61

An exhaustive assessment of the
infrastructure and technical requirements

ASPI also noted that submarine design
modification would have to occur due to
national regulatory and safety regimes; the
need to build submarines continuously in
a 30 year cycle, since existing Collins class
submarines are due to be obsolete by the
government’s aspirations of delivering the
first nuclear powered submarine by the
early 2030s; the possibility of Australian
nuclear submarines adopting a production
model similar to the Joint Strike Fighter
where Australian companies would be
directly involved in submarine production
with either American or British companies;
properly training the Australian submarine
workforce; and ASPI’s cost estimate that
an eight boat nuclear submarine program
will cost between $A70-$116 billion
($ 52,468,850,000- $86,948,380,000)
depending on inflation.63
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This report proceeded to provide analysis

HMAS Stirling Base in Western Australia

of possible outcomes including determining

would take nearly 20 days traveling 3,500

possible national supplier partners who

nautical miles at a speed of 18 knots to

must assist Australia in designing, building,

reach the South China Sea, could only

operating, and sustaining the submarines

patrol there 11 days and need 30 days

and their operational assets; the best ways

to return while requiring it to surface

to build the submarine while maximizing

several times to recharge its batteries

Australian industry participation in the

and make it vulnerable to detection from

program and the best way to build nuclear

ships, submarines, and satellites due to its

submarines; the need for the Australian

increased heat, noise, and radar signatures.

Submarine Task Force to consider all factors

By contrast, a nuclear submarine could

involved in building an effective military

make this journey to the South China Sea in

force; andthe program’s delivery schedule

seven days at speeds of 20-25 knots, stay

with the government indicating that the

on patrol 75 days, and require a another

late 2030s would be the time frame for an

seven days to return enabling it to spend

operational nuclear submarine capability to

600% additional time on patrol without

occur.64

surfacing and rapidly relocating to other
operational areas if security conditions

Additional factors stressed by this ASPI

required.[See Figure 11].65

report include the need for Australia to
develop a nuclear industrial capacity to

The following table from this study

maintain and sustain nuclear submarines

demonstrates the difference in submarine

operating out of Australian facilities;

power capacity between Collins, Astute, and

recognizing that a conventionally powered

Virginia class submarines:

Collins submarine traveling from the

Peak power

Peak Power

(Megawatts thermal

Megawatts electric

heat)(MWTH)

(MWe)

Virginia Class

210.0

42.0

17.0

Astute Class

145.0

29.0

11.6

Collins Class

5.2

4.2

0.666

ASPI went on to assert that while the

Average Power (MWe)

nuclear propulsion technology, safety and

UK and US face capacity constraints in

reliability, and training sailors on reactors;

their nuclear submarine programs, the U.S.

that Australia should not be responsible

has better size, depth, and capacity with

for storage of high-level nuclear waste

its naval and private sector submarine

since it has no experience or expertise in

building industry in areas including

this area; the number of RAN submariner
25
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personnel will have to grow from 900-3,000;

required to enhance submariner recruitment

the desire to maximize Australian industry

and retention to counter a diminishing

participation could produce increased

submarine workforce. Examples of such

subsystems and components which

methods Defence should be engaging in

would potentially increase program cost,

to incentivize submariner careers include

schedule, and risk; questioned whether

conducting tours of Navy ships; science,

submarine maintenance could be done

technology, engineering, and mathematics

by an existing dock in Sydney or whether

partnership programs; fitness preparation

building new dry docks in Adelaide would

programs; and a national competition

be required; determining whether these

rewarding applicants with a tour of a

submarines should be based on Australia’s

submarine. This document also suggested

west, south, or heavily populated east

Australia should look at ways the UK has

coasts will politically challenging; the need

been able to raise submariner’s profiles

to alter the current legal prohibitions on

without compromising national security.68

licensing, building, and operating a nuclear
fabrication plant in the 1998 Nuclear Safety
Act and 1999 Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act and state
and territorial legislation regulating nuclear
and radiation activities; determining
which agency(ies) will regulate nuclear
submarines; determining whether the
workforce should be all Australian or a
mixture of imported American and British
workers and Australians; and determining
whether to use highly enriched uranium
(HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) naval
reactors. The U.S., UK, Russia, and India use
HEU nuclear reactors in their submarines
while China and France use LEU nuclear
reactors in their submarines.

67

RAN reports have also scrutinized

This work also expressed concern that
RAN recruitment has failed to distinguish
submarine service from the rest of the fleet
and that future naval recruitment should
highlight the secretive and exciting nature
of submarine service by linking it to an
individual’s need for national recognition.
This can be done by highlighting past
submarine force achievements including
creating specialized submarine exhibitions
and documentaries and using the
Australian War Memorial to tell stories of
historical service on Australian submarines.
Additional steps the government should
take to enhance submarine workforce
development is integrating a civilian
nuclear energy workforce capacity into RAN
requirements so nuclear submariners can

multiple factors required for developing and

serve in this industry following their naval

deploying a nuclear submarine fleet. A 2021

careers; including nuclear specialists as a

assessment noted that providing solutions

priority migration skilled occupational list;

to workforce, sustainment, and nuclear

developing partnerships with universities

technical capability are key challenges this

and the defense industry; and stressing the

force will face in the coming decade. It

nuclear submarine force as being Australia’s

also observed that significant efforts will be

foremost strategic deterrent.69
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Additional debate considers where

to Papua New Guinea Mike Goldman

Australia should deploy its nuclear

emphasized that the U.S. had strong

submarines upon completion. Adelaide

expectations for the potential scale and

and Stirling have already been considered

capability of this naval base without offering

as possible options. In March 2022, Prime

U.S. financial support or direct negotiations

Minister Morrison announced possible

with PNG.71

Australian east coast basing options include
Brisbane, Port Kembla in Wollongong, and
Newcastle though a problem with this last
site is that this port is 50% Chinese owned.
The ultimate decision on purchasing nuclear
submarines will be made after the May 21,
2022 national election in which Morrison’s
center-right Coalition Government could
be defeated by the center-left Labour
Party opposition lead by Anthony Albanese
which has said it conditionally supports
AUKUS with these conditions including
not supporting a domestic civil nuclear
industry, not acquiring nuclear weapons,
and continued compliance with the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.70
Another potential RAN nuclear submarine
base option is Lombrun Naval Base on
Manus Island in Papua, New Guinea. This
facility has experienced naval activity
since World War II and been the subject
of European historical interest since
Spanish exploration in the 16th century
and during World War I. More recently
it served as a detention and processing
center for individuals seeking asylum in
Australia. During July 2018, Australian
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Papua
New Guinean (PNG) leader Peter O’Neill
discussed possible base redevelopment
with Vice-President Mike Pence announcing
U.S. support for this initiative in November
2018. In May 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador

A 2021 RAN study stressed Manus
Island’s strategic value to Australia as
follows:
There are three reasons why
Australia continues to be interested in
Manus. First, the islands are proximate
territory through which a conventional
military attack would most likely originate….
If a hostile great power possessed a
forward operating military base, they
would be more capable of undertaking a
conventional attack upon the Australian
mainland with lower risks, fewer capabilities
and sustain the operations longer than
if they were forced to launch the assault
from more distant areas. Since Europeans
first settled Australia it has been an
enduring security anxiety that a hostile
great power may acquire a foothold within
the Melanesian Arc-which stretches from
East Timor to Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fijiflanking most of the north and north-east of
the continent.72
This RAN analysis went on to stress
that Australian sea lines of communication
(SLOC) to Asia and North America pass
through this area and that Japan’s 1942
occupation of New Caledonia, Fiji, and
Samoa established air and submarine
bases which sought to disrupt supply
routes between the U.S. and Australia. If
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tensions escalate in the South China Sea

change its patrolling patterns, maritime

and the Straits of Malacca, it would increase

awareness activities, and the strategic

the desirability of alternative routes

calculus if Chinese navy vessels operate

through Indonesia including Sunda Strait

in this area since it puts them much closer

and Lombok Strait that would enhance

to the Australian mainland. In partial

Lombrun and Manus’ attractiveness. China

response, Australia’s High Commissioner

has expressed interest in developing PNG

(Ambassador) to the Solomon Islands

ports at Wewak, Kikori, Vanaimo, and

Lachlan Strahan announced an extra $A 20

Manus Island and media reports in March

million ($14,870,480) in assistance to that

2022 announced that China had signed

country including extending the Solomon

a draft security cooperation agreement

Islands International Assistance Force

with the Solomon Islands which are 1,133

until December 2023 and building a radio

miles from PNG which would enable

network and second border patrol boat

the Solomon Islands to request China

outpost.73

sending police and military personnel
and potentially establish a military base.
Australian Defence Force Joint Operations
Commander Lieutenant General Greg Bilton

This RAN assessment made various
capabilities and cost estimates for Manus
Island including

said the possibility of a Chinese base in
the Solomon’s would require Australia to

Option 1 Maintenance

Use for 21 Guardian Class patrol

Hub for Pacific Patrol

boats built by Australia for various $19,900,685,000

Boats
Option 2 Mothballed

Pacific Island countries.
Build sufficient infrastructure to

$A 414 million

Launch Pad

be used on short notice for full

310,315,770,000

Option 3 Strategic

spectrum operations.
Expand Australian forward

Observation Post

surveillance capability into South
East and East Asia using piloted

Option 4 Forward

and unpiloted aircraft
Assist and simplify RAN and

Operating Base

Royal Australian Air Force

$A 26.55 million

$A 281 million-$1.011 billion
$210,624,955,000$757,800,105,000
$A 807.1 million
$604,965,841,000

forward operations by enhancing
warfighting capabilities, strategic
presence, implant strategic
uncertainty in opponents minds,
and be more attractive for
submarines
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Option 5 Geostrategic

Develop Lombrun Base as the

$A 3.737 billion

Strongpoint

point of Australian geopolitical

($2,801,087,035,000).74

spear; use to project Indo-Pacific
influence and launch sea control
operations; serve as a hardpoint
in Australian maritime layered
defense to complicate or prevent
opponent seapower projection
into the Melanesian Arc; and
integrate into emerging U.S. IndoPacific strategy.
An updated demonstration of Australian

and nuclear force structures and behavior

submarine budget priorities for the

in numerous global oceanic venues. The

upcoming fiscal year and presented ahead

2021 U.S. Defense Department report

of a projected May 2022 parliamentary

on Chinese military power documents

election was made in a defense portfolio

that China has the world’s largest navy

budget document submitted to the

consisting of approximately 355 surface

Australian Parliament by that country’s

ships and submarines; that it has enhanced

Minister of Defense Peter Dutton in the

its antisubmarine warfare inventory and

annual budget speech made March 29, 2022

training to protect its aircraft carriers and

by Australian Treasurer Josh Frydenberg.

ballistic missile submarines; and that it

This document called for spending $A 425

currently operates six nuclear-powered

million ($318,560,875,000) on AUKUS nuclear

ballistic missile submarines, six nuclear-

submarine capacity for fiscal year 2022-

powered attack submarines; and 46 diesel-

2023 and the upcoming election results

powered attack submarines. It is expected

and subsequent security environment

that by the mid-2020s China’s nuclear

and program planning and building

powered attack submarine capabilities will

developments will determine how accurate

include the Type 093B Shang guided-missile

this initial spending proposal is.75

attack submarine capable of providing a

Australia, the United Kingdom, and
United States being able to sustain AUKUS
program development and sustainment
will require considerable political will
and strategic persistence over the next
two decades. There is ample literature
documenting increasing Chinese
geopolitical assertiveness in the maritime
buildup as reflected in their conventional

clandestine land-attack option if equipped
with land-attack cruise missiles. Although
China does not have a robust deep water
antisubmarine warfare capability it is
enhancing its antisubmarine warfare
assets and training to better protect high
value targets such as aircraft carriers and
submarines while striving to increase the
importance of ASW in achieving broader
29
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maritime goals including open seas
protection and preserving access to the
Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.76
China also seeks to exert coercive
leverage over its Indo-Pacific neighbors,
including Australia, by using its growing
ballistic missile arsenal as documented in
the current report on this subject produced
by the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and
Space Intelligence Center with the following
two tables demonstrating the numbers and
ranges of Chinese intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM’s) and submarine and shiplaunched ballistic missiles:

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Systems

Number of

Warheads Per

Propellant

Deployment

Maximum

Number of

CSS-3 ICBM

Stages
2

Missile
1

Liquid

Mode
Transportable

Range (km)
5,500+

Launchers
10-15

CSS-4 Mod 2

2

1

Liquid

Silo

12,000+

About 20

ICBM
CSS-4 Mod 3

2 +PBV

Multiple

Liquid

Silo

12,000+

About 20

ICBM
CSS-10 Mod 1

3

1

Solid

Road-Mobile

7,000+

15+

ICBM
CSS-10 Mod 2

3

1

Solid

Road-Mobile

11,000+

15+

ICBM
DF-31AG ICBM

3

Unknown

Solid

Road-Mobile

Unknown

16+

CSS-20 ICBM

3+PBV

Multiple

Solid

Road-Mobile

Unknown

16+77

Propellant

Deployment

Maximum

Number of

Range (km)
7,000+

Launchers
48

10,000+

Not available78

Submarine and Ship-Launched Ballistic
Missiles
Systems

Number of

Warheads Per

CSS-N-14 (JL-2)

Stages
3

Missile
1

Solid

Mode
JIN Sub

SLBM
JL-3

3

Multiple

Solid

Type 096 Sub
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The AUKUS agreement has produced

assumptions about a future Indo-Pacific

mixed reactions among Australia’s

war. These include:

neighbors. Indonesian and Malaysian
leaders expressed concern to Morrison
that AUKUS could instigate a regional
arms race in Southeast Asia and cause
countries to act more aggressively in
the South China Sea while Cambodia
expressed alarm about AUKUS and how it
might impact international nonproliferation
commitments. Indonesian Defense
Minister Prabowo Subianto later said he
understood and respected AUKUS following
direct communications with Australian
Government leaders. Philippine President
Rodrigo Duterte castigated AUKUS as
an “arms race”, but Manila’s Secretary of
Defense Delfin Lorenzana and Foreign
Minister Teddy Locsin said Australia had
every right to strengthen its defense.
Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam presented
more measured responses saying each
country is responsible for its own security
and should strive not to contribute to a
regional arms race. There has also been
sentiment for expanding AUKUS to other
Asian countries including Japan, India,
South Korea, and Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries although
opposition to South Korea acquiring a
nuclear submarine capability has been
expressed on practical operational
grounds.

79

As AUKUS countries prepare to embark
on this program and its possible use in

▶ Not assuming the Chinese way
of war is similar to the West’s.
Chinese strategic culture and
operational mindsets stem from
their continental power status
and fending off foreign invasions
by extensively using political,
psychological, and kinetic
operations.
▶ Viewing the West as being in
competition with China such
as an athletic competition
or business rivalry. China
actually sees itself as being
in a continuous struggle
or Long March against the
West consisting of united
front political warfare, new
generation warfare, and nonwar warfare.
▶ China is not a serious rival since
its defense spending is only ¼ of
the U.S. defense budget. When
using Purchasing Power Parity
methodology as a measure
Chinese defense spending rises
to nearly 70% of U.S. defense
spending, but when lower costs
of Chinese personnel spending
are included, Chinese defense
spending reaches 90-120% of
U.S. defense spending.
▶ Beijing initiating a major

military operations against China, they

war against Western allies is

should heed the advice expressed in an

too risky to happen. China

Australian Defence and Security Studies

could engage in such a war

Journal analysis on ten questionable

if confronted by a failing
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economy; rapidly aging

an extended, multidimensional,

workers; a resurgent U.S.;

and very complex war, has many

rising dissent in the Communist

strategically important military

Party or a direct challenge to

assets underground, hardened

its survival might cause Beijing

strategic communication

to conclude that drastic action

systems; developed large fuel,

such as reunifying Taiwan may

spare parts, and food reserves,

be needed to deliver the “China

and promoted a national

dream” and unite the country.

narrative with formidable

▶ The West has superior

information control, and

strategies, operational concepts,

taken steps to prepare China

and forces. Chinese military

psychologically for a lengthy

transformation has rapidly

struggle.

narrowed its technological and

▶ It is enough for the west to

operational proficiency gaps

plan for a single phase kinetic

with the U.S. Beijing will make

conflict instead of a conflict

extensive use of disinformation

continuum. China sees war

and breaking the political will

as a multi-layered continuum

of its adversaries in future

based on Mao Zedong’s belief

conflict scenarios based on U.S.

that if communist forces

experiences in Korea, Vietnam,

fight powerful advanced

and potentially Afghanistan

technology opponents they

and political will play a decisive

must ensure the conflict is

role in a Sino-Western military

protracted by undermining and

confrontation.

dividing enemy communities

▶ A major war will be
geographically limited. China’s
military development and

and disrupting opposition
campaigns.
▶ Non-military capabilities

capability acquisition programs

will be peripheral in a future

make clear that it will engage in

major war. Emerging U.S.

heavy cyber and space attacks,

and allied Western Pacific

sabotage operations by insiders

military capabilities are just

and special forces, long-range

geared toward conducting

missile and air attacks, mining,

conventional advanced military

and other attacks against allied

operations. The West should

military assets and civilian

place increased attention on

infrastructures.

preparing for extended conflict

▶ A future Indo-Pacific war would

going beyond military activities

be short. China is preparing for

and incorporating non-military
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elements.
▶ The West has the best

and social objectives, being attentive to a
continually changing Indo-Pacific maritime

structures for planning,

threat environment, and coping with

preparing, and commanding

other national security challenges such

next-generation warfare. The

as the 2022 Russian military aggression

U.S. and its allies have not

against Ukraine, potential military action

fought a major power opponent

by rogue nations such as Iran and North

since the Korean War and have

Korea, and other potential transnational

not hardened, dispersed, or

military scenarios which may emergent in

protected key personnel and

subsequent years.

systems. Difficult to manage
and clumsy acquisition systems
ensure that it takes 20-40
years for new aircraft, ships,
and tanks to be delivered into
service. This poses an acute
disadvantage to fast-moving
defense acquisition systems
of China and other dictatorial
militaries which is exacerbated
by western deficiencies in the
second and third kinetic layers
of major military conflict.80

POLITICAL/MILITARY/TECHNICAL
▶ Proceed with program with
acute awareness of cost
overruns, potential management
problems, delays, and evolving
international security threat
environment.
▶ Recommendations for the U.S.
broken down by governmental
entity for implementing and
effectively overseeing AUKUS
should include:

RECOMMENDATIONS AND
SOLUTIONS
Building and successfully deploying
AUKUS nuclear submarines will prove to
be formidable challenges for Australia, the
United Kingdom, and United States. It will
require ongoing patience and persistence
by all three countries despite political
governance changes in subsequent years,
the need for consistent funding streams,
transcending news about inevitable cost
overruns, management problems and
program delays, pressures to divert funding
from AUKUS to existing domestic political

▶ The Chief of Naval Operations
shifting the submarine tender’s
homeport to Australia to
incentivize Australian sailors
and maintainers learning the
requirements of supporting
nuclear-powered submarines.
▶ Opening U.S. Navy nuclear
training facilities to the Royal
Australian Navy creating fresh
cadres of nuclear submariners
ready to go to sea while also
training future Australian
nuclear-power instructors to
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facilitate eventual development

congressional support on a

of an indigenous Australian

decades long project to assist

nuclear-power training pipeline.

in building Australia’s nuclear

▶ Increasing submarine port

submarine program, forward-

visits and expanding nuclear

basing U.S. Navy personnel

maintenance at Australian ports

and platforms, and enhancing

where nuclear facilities are

the U.S.-Australian alliance for

located while also considering

forthcoming generations.

potential long-term Australian
basing.
▶ The Secretaries of Energy and
the Navy should direct the Naval

▶ Explore possibility of expanding
AUKUS to other Indo-Pacific
countries.
▶ Continual and candid public

Reactors program to establish

information campaigns

field offices in Australia which

from participating national

are critical to Australia’s

governments on why AUKUS

nuclear submarine program to

is essential for the economic

assist with future submarine

and national security of these

manufacture, maintenance, and

countries and their allies in view

training while inviting Canberra

of emerging Chinese maritime

to create a parallel institution.

and geopolitical challenges.

▶ The Director of National

▶ The need for Australia to

Intelligence should establish a

achieve rapprochement with

consultation forum for sharing

France and include Paris as a

naval nuclear information

valued partner in consulting

with Australia based on the

about future Indo-Pacific

existing Five Eyes Intelligence

strategic policies given France’s

sharing agreement providing a

historical and contemporary

trustworthy basis for securely

influence in this region.

handling sensitive information.
▶ The Secretary of State should

▶ The need for rigorous and
effective congressional and

expand the existing 1958 U.S.-UK

parliamentary oversight of

nuclear agreement to include

AUKUS to ensure that it remains

Australia.

on time, meets operational

▶ House and Senate

objectives, and does not have

congressional leaders should

inordinate cost overruns and

establish a joint congressional

production delays.

coordinating working group

▶ AUKUS countries remaining

on AUKUS. This will require

continually aware of submarine

the Navy to receive sustained

warfare technological and
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strategic developments
by China and other hostile
international actors and
incorporating countermeasures
into submarine construction
and military doctrine.
▶ Being agile in responding to
Chinese attempts to thwart or
deflect AUKUS development and
deployment through diplomatic,
economic, information, and
covert or overt operations.81
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GEOSPACIAL AND PICTORIAL
INDEX
FIGURE 1: U.S. NAVY VIRGINIA-CLASS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

Source: U.S. Naval Institute82

FIGURE 5: BRITISH DREADNOUGHT CLASS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

Source: UK Ministry of Defence83
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FIGURE 3: ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY COLLINS CLASS SUBMARINE

Source: Royal Australian Navy84

FIGURE 4: ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY SHIPYARD-OSBORNE NEAR ADELAIDE,
SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Source: Australian Department of Defence85
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FIGURE 5: ROYAL NAVY SUBMARINE AT HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE, SCOTLAND

Source: UK Government, Delivering for Scotland86

FIGURE 6: CHINA ICBM MISSILE RANGES

Source: Economist and Defense Intelligence Agency87
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FIGURE 7: AVERAGE DAYS OF LABOR EXCEEDING THE SCHEDULED NUMBER
FOR NUCLEAR SHIPS 2008-2019

Source: Congressional Budget Office88

FIGURE 8: TOTAL LENGTH OF MAINTENANCE DELAYS BY TYPE OF SUBMARINE

Source: Congressional Budget Office89
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FIGURE 9: CANNIBALIZATION OF PARTS BY CLASS OF SUBMARINE

Source: Congressional Budget Office90

FIGURE 10: LOCATION OF U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ASSEMBLY FACILITIES
AND OWNERSHIP STATUS
Shipyard
Electric Boat
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Newport News Shipbuilding
Pearl Harbor Shipyard and Intermediate

Sector
Private
Public
Private
Public

Naval Facility
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Public
Puget Sound Shipyard and Intermediate Public

Location
Groton, CT
Portsmouth, VA
Newport News, VA
Pearl Harbor, HI
Kittery, ME
Bremerton, WA91

Naval Facility
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration91
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FIGURE 11: THE BENEFITS OF A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FLEET IN AUSTRALIA

Source: The Heritage Foundation92

FIGURE 12: CHINESE SHANG CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINE

Source: TCongressional Research Service93
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FIGURE 13: CHINESE JIN CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE

Source: Congressional Research Service94
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